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Evaluating Farmland Investments
Considering Dynamic Stochastic
Returns and Farmland Prices
Gary D. Schnitkey,  C. Robert Taylor, and Peter J. Barry
This paper examines  farmland investment  decisions using a stochastic  dynamic
programming framework.  Consideration  is given to the dynamic,  stochastic nature  of
farmland  returns, linkages between farmland returns and farmland prices, and the
effects of the above dynamic  factors on a farm's financial structure.  Optimal decisions
to purchase  or sell farmland are found for a central  Illinois farm with high  quality
farmland.  Sizes and debt distributions  are  then determined, given that the optimal
decision  rule is followed.  Decisions from the dynamic programming  model also are
compared  to a capital budgeting  model.
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Land transactions have significant impacts on
a farm's  profitability  and  financial  structure.
Much research has analyzed various aspects of
these impacts with emphasis given to financing
firm growth. Using debt capital to finance firm
growth  requires  an increase  in leverage  posi-
tion which  increases  the firm's  risk  position
(Barry,  Hopkin,  and  Baker),  alters  the  time
pattern of cash flows (Ellinger, Barry, and Lins;
Lee),  reduces  its  liquidity  (Barry and Baker),
and  may affect the optimal  production  orga-
nization  (Baker).  Alternative  strategies  for
managing debt and equity capital also affect a
firm's risk position  (Held and Helmers;  Hin-
man and Hutton), consumption  patterns,  and
production decisions (Johnson and Boehlje).
These financing  issues are  important when
considering  farmland  purchase  or  sale  deci-
sions. Other important factors include the sto-
chastic,  dynamic  nature  of farmland  returns
(Alston; Burt)  and linkages between farmland
returns and prices (Burt). Most previous stud-
ies either assume that future farmland returns
and  prices  are  known  with  certainty  or  that
their distributions are known unconditionally.
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A major objective of this paper is to analyze
optimal  farmland  investment  decisions  con-
sidering  the above  two  dynamic  factors  and
their effects  on a farm's financial structure.  A
stochastic dynamic programming (DP) model
of a fully  owned crop farm  is conceptualized
and then numerically  solved to determine op-
timal farmland transactions  for a central  Illi-
nois farm with high quality farmland.  The DP
results  then  are  compared  to  those  obtained
from  a  traditional,  static  capital  budgeting
model (e.g.,  Barry, Hopkin, and Baker; Lee et
al.). This comparison  evaluates  possible  per-
formance gains attributable to fully integrating
the dynamic components into  the analysis.
The crop farm is conceptualized in the next
section.  In the second section  the conceptual
model is used to specify  a dynamic program-
ming model. Numerical parameters  for a cen-
tral  Illinois  farm  with  high  quality  land  are
given in the third section.  The  final  sections
present  results  from  the  dynamic  program-
ming  and  capital  budgeting  models,  consid-
ering their implications  for investment  anal-
ysis.
Crop Farm Model
The crop farm model is developed by dividing
time into yearly periods.  At the beginning of
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each year, a decision is made to either purchase
or sell farmland (i.e., farmland investment de-
cision).  During  the year,  realizations  of sto-
chastic,  dynamic returns  and dynamic  farm-
land prices occur. These realizations, along with
the farmland  investment  decision,  affect  the
farm's debt-to-asset position. Key elements of
the  model  include  relationships  representing
the stochastic, dynamic nature of farmland re-
turns, dynamic farmland price movements, and
the crop farm's  financial structure.
Farmland returns are represented  by direct
returns  per  acre.  Direct returns  give  returns
before  fixed factor  payments  and equal  gross
revenue minus variable costs (i.e., seed, chem-
ical,  fertilizer,  machinery,  and  hired  labor
costs). The stochastic, dynamic nature of direct
returns is captured by a first-order Markovian
density function:
(1)
where DR, equals  direct return in year t, and
ut is a random variable. Thefi()  function gives
the DRt+  density function conditional  on the
DR, level.
Farmland prices are determined by a deter-
ministic relationship depending on the lagged
direct return and two previous farmland prices:
(2)
This  Markovian  relationship  is  based  on  a
modified  version  of a capitalization  formula
developed  by Burt.
The remaining  specifications  reflect  a fully
owned farm's  financial components.  (The full
ownership assumption  is used to focus atten-
tion  on  farmland  investment  decisions.)  Fi-
nancial  components  are modeled by defining
financial stocks and flows. Financial stocks de-
scribe the farm's asset and debt balances at the
beginning  of each  year.  Financial  flows  then
change these balances  during the year.
Financial  Stocks of a Crop Farm
Definition of a crop farm's financial stocks be-
gins with the standard accounting identity:
(3)  W, = Assets,  - Debtst,
where  Wt is wealth  (i.e., equity capital) at the
beginning of year  t.  Assets and  debts  are di-
vided into three categories  leading to a stan-
dard accounting identity of:
(4)  W, = Pt*OA, +  OFA(OA,)  + HFI,,
where  OA, equals the number of owned acres,
OFA(.)  is a function giving the value  of other
farm  assets,  and  HFIt equals  the holdings  of
financial  instruments.  The  first two  terms to
the  right  of equation  (4)'s  equality  sign  give
the value of farm assets. The first term, Pt*OAt,
equals the value of farmland while the second
term, OFA(OAt), gives the value of other farm
assets.  Other  farm  assets  are  all  assets  other
than farmland including production  invento-
ries,  supplies,  investment  in  growing  crops,
machinery,  and buildings.  Negative  amounts
of HFIt represent  debt  used to  finance  farm
assets. In addition,  positive amounts  of HFIt
represent holdings of financial assets when no
debt is needed to finance  financial asset hold-
ings. This  representation  implies  that an in-
dividual can  hold portions  of wealth in both
farm and financial assets or expand farm asset
holdings by reducing farm asset holdings and
increasing debt holdings.  Debt holdings mod-
eled  by HFIt do  not include  operating  debt.
Operating  debt is  handled  separately  as  dis-
cussed below. In addition, interest rates on debt
and financial asset holdings vary according to
relative  holdings  of financial  instrument  and
farm  assets.
These relative  holdings are  measured  by a
debt-to-farm-asset  ratio  (DFA,):
(5)  DFA, = -HFIt/[Pt*OA, + OFA(OAt)].
This ratio  differs from commonly  used debt-
to-asset ratios. Positive amounts ofDFAt equal
debt  relative  to total assets,  the typical  debt-
to-asset  ratio. Negative amounts represent  fi-
nancial  asset  holdings  relative  to  farm  asset
holdings.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  DFAt
equals .25. By rearranging equation (5)'s terms,
the  HFIt value  can  be  found  to  equal
-. 25[P,*OAt +  OFA(OA)]. The negative  val-
ue indicates that debt capital is used to finance
farm assets. If, instead, DFAt equals -. 25, then
HFI, is a positive .25[Pt*OA, +  OFA(OA,)],
indicating financial asset holding.
Using equation  (5),  the accounting  identity
in (4) is stated as:
(6)  Wt = [Pt*OAt + OFA(OA,)][1  - DFAJ].
Wealth is summarized by three variables: the
price  of farmland  (Pt), the number  of owned
acres  (OAt),  and  the debt-to-farm-asset  ratio
(DFAt).  During  the year,  the farmland  price
changes due to the Markovian farmland price
relationship  (equation  (2)).  Financial  flows
change  the latter two variables.
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Financial  Flows of a Crop Farm
Farmland purchases or  sales can occur at the
beginning of a year.  Variable DOA,  gives the
number  of acres purchased  or sold, with pos-
itive  and negative  amounts  respectively  rep-
resenting purchases and sales. Any 80-acre  in-
crement of farmland can be purchased or sold
at the current  farmland price  (Pt). Farm  size
resulting from the decision equals:
(7) OAt+I =  OA, + DOA,.
Farmland  purchases  (sales)  require  an  in-
vestment (disinvestment) in farm assets (INVt)
equaling:
(8)  INV, = Pt*DOA, + OFA(OAt+,)  - OFA(OA,)
+ TC(DOA,, P,, DFA,).
The  (Pt*DOAt) term  represents  the  value  of
farmland purchased (sold) while [OFA(OAt+l)
- OFA(OAt)] equals the change in other farm
asset holdings.  The  function  TC(.) gives two
types of  transaction costs. First, a 1%  surcharge
is  placed  on  the  amount  of newly  acquired
debt.  Second,  a  5% charge  representing  bro-
kerage  fees is placed on the value of farmland
sales.  Both  of these  values  represent  typical
service  fees  and  other  costs  associated  with
land transactions. Investment (disinvestment)
yields  new  financial  asset  holdings  (CHFIt)
equaling:
(9) CHFI, = HFIt  - INV,,
where INVt  is  investment  given by equation
(8)
After  farmland  investment  decisions  are
made, realization of  before-tax income occurs.
Before-tax income is defined as:
(10)  It+, = DRt+,*OAt+l - FC(OAt+l)
+ i(DFA,, INVt,  OAt+,)CHFIt
- OD(DFA,, INV,,  OAt+),
where
(a) (DRt+l*OAt+,) gives  the  gross  margin
from owned acres. DRt+  is a random variable
whose  distribution  is  given  by equation  (1).
Thus, before-tax income also is a random vari-
able.
(b) FC(OAt+ 1) is a function giving nonland
fixed  costs.  Fixed  costs  depend  on farm  size
and  include  depreciation,  hired  labor,  farm
supplies,  buildings and  fence  repair,  utilities,
and  insurance.  All  fixed  costs,  including  de-
preciation,  are assumed to be cash costs.
(c) i(DFAt, INVt, OAt+l) is a function giving
the interest rate on holdings of financial assets.
This function allows differing interest rates on
positive  and  negative  financial  instrument
holdings and an increasing interest cost struc-
ture for higher positive debt-to-farm-asset  ra-
tios.  The CHFIt equals the holdings  of finan-
cial  assets  after  making  farmland  decisions.
Thus,  the  [i(DFA,, INVt,  OAt+1)CHFIt] term
gives the returns from financial asset holdings
or  the interest  costs  incurred from  nonoper-
ating  debt.
(d) OD(DFAt, INVt+1,  OAt+,) is a function
giving the interest costs on operating debt. Op-
erating debt equals cash requirements per acre
times the number of acres farmed less any pos-
itive financial  asset holdings.  Operating debt
is multiplied by the interest rate to determine
interest costs.  Only interest costs on operating
debt are accounted for by OD(.) because actual
operating expenses are accounted  for in DRt1.
Tax payments and consumption  withdraw-
als are defined by a flow of funds (FLOWt+ )
equation:
(11)
FLOWt  + = It + - TAX(It+,,  INVt, DOA,)  - Ct
where  It+1  equals before-tax  income given by
equation  (10),  TAX(-)  is  a function  defining
federal and state tax liabilities, and Ct is a with-
drawal  for family  living purposes.  Note that
consumption withdrawals are not treated as a
decision  variable.  This  treatment  abstracts
from economic and financial  theory in which
investment,  financing,  and  withdrawal  deci-
sions  are made jointly.  Consumption  is  rep-
resented  as  a  fixed  withdrawal  because  this
method  models  farmers'  consumption  pat-
terns  reasonably  well  (Davis,  Mullen,  and
Bryant;  Giraro,  Tomek, and Mount).
Given INVt and FLO W,+ , the debt-to-farm-
asset ratio at the end of the year (DFAt+  l)  equals
the  beginning  financial  instrument  holdings
[(Pt*OAt + OFA(OAt))DFAt], plus investment
(INVt),  less  flow  (FLOWtJ+).  The  resulting
quantity  is divided  by the ending total  farm
asset  value,  [Pt+*OAt+l +  OFA(OAt+)I], to
give:
[(P*,OAt + OFA(OA,))DFAIt
(12)  DFA  -I  + INV, - FLOWt+l
P(1  ) I OAt+l + OFA(OAt+ 1)
Although equation  (12)  is a deterministic  re-
lationship,  DFAt+ 1 is a  random variable  be-
cause FLOWt+ 1 is a random variable.
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The Dynamic  Programming (DP)  Model
Specification  of the  DP  model requires  one
stochastic state variable-direct return (DRt)-
and  four  nonstochastic  state  variables-the
previous two farmland prices (Pt and Pt-,), the
number  of owned  acres  (OA,),  and the debt-
to-farm-asset  ratio  (DFAt).  State  transition
equations for the direct return, farmland price,
owned  acres,  and  debt-to-farm-asset  ratio
variables  are given by equations  (1),  (2),  (7),
and  (12),  respectively.  The  decision  variable
is  the  number  of acres  to  purchase  or  sell
(DOAt).
The presumed objective is to maximize the
expected  value  of terminal  after-tax  wealth.
Denoting the  final year  as  T,  after-tax wealth
can be written as a function of the state vari-
ables:
(13)  VT(DRT,  PT, PT-1, OAT, DFAr)
= [OAT*PT + OFA(OAr)]
(1 - DFAT) - TC(OA,  Pt)
- ETAX(Pt, OAt,  TC()),
where  VT(')  is the recursive objective function
for  year  T,  TC(.) gives  the transaction  costs
on a total sale of farmland,  and ETAX(.)  is a
function giving taxes on the total sale of farm-
land. Equation (13)  leads to a general recursive
equation of:
(14)  Vt(DR,, P,, Pt-l, OAt,  DFAt)
= MAX  E[Vt+(DRt+ , Pt+  ,  Pt,
DOAt
OA+ I, DFA,+1 )],
where  E[.] is  an  expectations  operator.  The
Vt+I(.)  gives  the expected  value  of after-tax
wealth for each  state variable level, assuming
that optimal decisions are made.
Given the  recursive  equation  and the state
transition  equations  in (1),  (2),  (7),  and  (12),
the maximization problem for an arbitrary year
is:
(15-a)  V,(DRt,  PPt,  A,,  , DFA)
=  MAX E(V,+ (DR,+  , Pt+  ,  Pt,
DOAt
OA,t+,  DFA,+ ),
subject to
(15-b)  DRt+, = f(DR,,  u,),
(1 5-c)  P,+  ,  = f2(DR,, P., Pt.  ),
(15-d)  OAt+  = OA,  + DOA,,
[(Pt*OAt + OFA(OA,))DFAt]
+ INVt  - FLOWt+
(15-e)  DFA  +  (OA Pt+l*OAt+l + OFA(OAt+,)
This model  is used  to recursively  derive  op-
timal  farmland  investment  decision  rules-
optimal decisions for all possible state variable
values.  Optimal  decision rules converge  after
a sufficient number of periods have been solved
for because returns are  compounded  and the
state transition  equations  are  stable  between
years  (see Bellman for a proof).
Numerical Estimates of the
State Transition Equations
To numerically  solve the DP model, estimates
were needed for the stochastic, Markovian  di-
rect return relationship  (equation  (15-b)),  the
Markovian  farmland price relationship (equa-
tion (15-c)),  and the various functions and pa-
rameters  within  the  debt-to-farm-asset  ratio
state transition  equation (equation (15-e)).
The Stochastic, Markovian Direct
Return Relationship
A direct return series from  1954 through  1984
was constructed using data from Gallager  and
Green, the Illinois Department of Agriculture,
the Agricultural Conservation  Service, and the
Illinois  Farm  Business  Farm  Management
(FBFM) Association.  Each yearly observation
was deflated by the gross national product im-
plicit  price  deflator  using  1984  as  the  base.
Examination of alternative time-series models
suggested  that a  first-order  autoregressive
(AR(1))  structure adequately  modeled the  se-
ries'  time  dependent  nature.  Fitting a linear
AR(1)  form  [DRt = a,  +  a2DRt_-]  yielded
residuals that were not normally distributed as
judged  by  the  Bera-Jarque  test statistic.  Ex-
amination of the residuals suggested a log nor-
mal distribution and a natural logarithmic form
[ln(DRt)  =  a3  +  a4ln(DRt_)] was  fit.  Nor-
mality of these residuals could not be rejected.
The natural logarithmic  form had good sta-
tistical properties: autocorrelation of the error
term was rejected,  and heteroskedasticity  was
rejected for both the time dimension  and the
direct return level. However, the 1972 and 1973
residuals  were  outside  a  two standard  devia-
tion band from  zero. These  years were  asso-
ciated with large increases in direct returns due,
most  likely,  to  changes  in grain  export  con-
ditions. Similar occurrences  were judged high-
ly unlikely.  Therefore,  a dummy variable  for
1972  and  1973  was  added  to  the equation.
Resulting  parameter  estimates  and  standard
errors (in parentheses)  are:
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where DUM is an intercept dummy for  1972
and 1973. This equation has 27 degrees of  free-
dom,  a .1324  standard error of estimate,  and
a .8134 adjusted R2.
The Markovian Farmland  Price Relationship
The theoretical  foundation of the Markovian
farmland price equation was provided by Burt.
He developed  an  econometric  capitalization
model  in  which  farmland  price  was  deter-
mined by expectations of  future farmland rents
with previous rents  serving as the basis. This
model was estimated  using direct returns as a
proxy  for  rents  and  a  farmland  price  series
constructed  by Reiss  and Scott and  modified
by Burt.  Nonlinear least  squares was  used to
obtain estimates, such that estimates  are only
asymptotically  efficient.  Parameter  estimates
and  standard  errors  for  the  1960-84  period
are:
(17)  ln(P,) =  .2302  + .0503  n(DR,)
(.0168)  (.0167)








where E(ln(Pt))  = [ln(Pt)  - ln(u)],  u, is a ran-
dom error,  and MA  is a moving average error
component.  The coefficient  on the  MA  term
was fixed  at  .8000  due to upward  bias  asso-
ciated with maximum  likelihood estimates of
this parameter  (Sarghan and  Bhargava).  This
equation has  18  degrees  of freedom, a  .0215
standard  error  of estimate,  and  a  .9957  ad-
justed R2.
The Markovian farmland price relationship
was treated deterministically in the DP model.
Possible biases from this treatment should not
be large because the standard error of estimate
(36 in dollar terms) was small compared to the
size  of  the  farmland  price  state  increment
($150);  that  is,  a single  state increment  con-
tained about 95%  of the probability.
As  estimated,  the farmland  price  relation-
ship required two direct return (DRt and DR,  1)
and two farmland price (Pt and P,  -)  state vari-
ables  in  the  DP  model.  To  reduce  dimen-
sionality,  the DRt was  not included.  Its coef-
ficient  was  added to the  coefficient of DRt_,.
Possible  biases  that  could  result  from  this
modification were evaluated using a sequential
forecasting analysis.  Adding the two direct re-
turn variables together resulted in a worse pre-
diction relationship; however, predictions gen-
erally fell within a farmland price  interval.
The Debt-to-Farm-Asset  Ratio State
Transition Equation
Relationships and parameters within the debt-
to-farm-asset ratio transition equation requir-
ing  numerical  estimates  were:  (a) a  function
giving federal  and state income tax liabilities
(TAX(.)); (b) functions giving other farm assets
and fixed costs as a function of farm size (OFA
(.)  and FC(-)); (c)  a  function  giving  interest
rates on financial asset and debt holdings (i(.));
(d) a function giving operating debt costs (OD
(,));  and  (e) yearly consumption  withdrawals
(Ct).
Income tax liabilities were based on the 1988
federal and Illinois income tax codes. The fed-
eral  tax  code  for  a person  who  was  married
and filing jointly was used and contained four
inflation-indexed  marginal  tax  rates.  Three
percent was  added  to each  tax rate to reflect
expected  Illinois  tax  requirements.  Four  ex-
emptions were  used in calculating  deductions
from income. In addition, social security taxes
were  included  at  a  12.3%  rate  on  any  farm
income  other than capital gains with a maxi-
mum  social security tax of $5,166.
Other farm assets as a function  of farm size
were  estimated  using  cross  sectional  FBFM
data from  1983  and  1984.  Results  suggested
that holdings  of other  farm assets  were  con-
stant at  $354  per  acre  for farm sizes  greater
than  500  acres.  Similarly,  fixed  costs  were
found constant at $54  per acre  for farm  sizes
greater than 500 acres.
Interest rates used in the model included a
3% yearly real rate of return on financial assets.
Interest rates on long-term debt were based on
the three-tier Federal Land Bank interest rates
adopted by the St. Louis Farm Credit District
in 1986.  These tiers were  approximated by:
(18) i = .055  +  .13888DFA
3
on debt-to-farm-asset ratios between 0 and .75.
For debt-to-farm-asset  ratios greater than .75,
a .1189  interest rate was used.
Schnitkey, Taylor, and BarryWestern Journal  ofAgricultural  Economics
Based on data from Gallager and Green, op-
erating capital requirements  were assumed to
equal  $100  per acre.  Total  operating  capital
requirement  equaled  $100  times the number
of  acres  owned.  Operating  capital  require-
ments decreased  positive financial asset hold-
ings. If positive financial asset holdings did not
cover operating  requirements,  the remainder
was  financed  with an  operating note held for
one-half year.  A  .075  interest  rate  was  asso-
ciated  with  any  operating  requirements  ex-
ceeding financial asset holdings.
Relationships where consumption amounts
depended  on wealth and  income  levels  were
fit and were not significant.  Consumption per
year was assumed to be $20,000.
Optimal Decisions  from  the DP Model
From the above  numerical  specification,  op-
timal farmland investment decision rules were
formulated  using  a  numeric,  value-iteration
dynamic programming  algorithm.  This  algo-
rithm required discretizing  the  state and  de-
cision variables.  Five  direct return  intervals
were used which were zero, one, and two stan-
dard deviations from the asymptotic mean (i.e.,
$125,  $150,  $175,  $205,  and  $245).  Twenty
farmland price  intervals  ranged  from  $1,000
to $3,850 in $150 intervals. Five lagged farm-
land price  change  intervals  were  used which
were -$300,  -$150,  $0, $150,  and $300 from
the current farmland price.  Farm sizes ranged
in 80-acre increments from 500 to 1,460 acres.
A zero-acre farm size also was included to rep-
resent either farm bankruptcy  or a decision to
liquidate the  farm. This resulted in a total of
14 farm size intervals. The debt-to-farm-asset
ratio had  40  intervals which  ranged  in equal
increments  from  1 to  -. 5.  The  above  state
variable discretion  yielded a total of 280,000
state increments. There were 14 farmland pur-
chase  (sell)  decision  alternatives  for a begin-
ning farm  size,  exactly  matching the possible
ending farm size increments.
Deriving optimal farmland  investment de-
cision  rules began  in  the  final  year  and pro-
ceeded  recursively.  In  calculating  each  deci-
sion alternative's expected terminal wealth, the
recursive  objective  function  values  were  lin-
early interpolated because the ending farmland
price and  debt-to-farm-asset  ratio  values  did
not necessarily  match the  state interval  mid-
points.  Optimal  decisions were  found  for all
state  intervals  associated  with positive  farm
sizes. It was assumed that a farming operation
would not be restarted if  it had been liquidated.
Therefore,  optimal decisions  were  not calcu-
lated for zero-acre farm sizes. In addition, farm
bankruptcy  occurred when the debt-to-farm-
asset ratio exceeded one and the farm was liq-
uidated.
Optimal decision rules were generated until
they converged.  Convergence occurred by the
tenth yearly stage, implying that the converged
decision rule is applicable to all years up to the
tenth year  before the end of the planning ho-
rizon.  If, for example, the planning horizon is
20 years, the converged decision rule is appli-
cable for years one  through  10.
Figure  1 shows  a portion of the converged
decision rule. It consists of five panels showing
the optimal decisions for a 740-acre farm hav-
ing a .25 debt-to-farm-asset ratio. Each panel's
horizontal  axis  shows  the  current  farmland
price while the vertical  axis gives the optimal
number  of acres  to  purchase  (positive  num-
bers)  or sell (negative  numbers).  The  vertical
axis coordinate  closest to the horizontal  axis,
labeled "Sell All,"  represents a decision to liq-
uidate the farming operation. Each panel gives
decisions  for  a  fixed  farmland  price  move-
ment.  A farmland price  movement is defined
as the difference between the current farmland
price and the lagged farmland price (i.e., P, -
Pt_ ).  A  line  shows  optimal  decisions  for  a
fixed direct return.
This  figure is used to examine the relation-
ships among optimal farmland investment de-
cisions  and  direct  returns,  current  farmland
prices,  and  farmland  price  movements  (i.e.,
comparative  dynamics).  The optimal amount
of farmland  to purchase  (sell)  increases  (de-
creases)  as the:
(a) Direct return increases. For example, op-
timal investment decisions for a $0 farmland
price  movement  and  a $1,900  current  farm-
land price  are  shown in panel  C. They  range
from a 160-acre sale for $125  and $150 direct
returns to a 320-acre purchase for a $245 direct
return.  Higher  direct  returns  indicate  higher
expected direct returns in the near future (see
equation  16)  and  higher  expected  farmland
prices  (see equation  17).
(b)  Current farmland  price  decreases.  See,
for example, the dashed line in panel C which
shows  decisions for a $175  direct return and
a $0  farmland price  movement.  Optimal  de-
cisions  range  from  a  720-acre  purchase  for
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Panel  A, Farmland  Price  Movement  =  -$300
Decision
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  B. Farmland  Price Movement  =  -$150
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  C, Farmland  Price  Movement  =  $0
1000  1460  1900  2360  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price of  Land
prices below $1,150  to a liquidation  decision
for current prices greater then  $2,800. Higher
farmland  prices  reduce  the rate  of return  on
farm assets. For example,  a $175  direct return
generates  a lower return rate at a $1,900 farm-
Panel  D,  Farmland  Price  Movement  =  +$150
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  E. Farmland  Price Movement  = +$300
Decision
1000  1460  1900  2360  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price of  Land
Legend






Figure  1.  Optimal  decisions  for  a 740-acre
farm having a .25 debt-to-farm-asset  ratio giv-
en differing farmland price movements
land price  as  opposed  to a  $1,450  farmland
price. (Note that this does not imply farmland
prices are independent of returns. Returns en-
ter into determination  of farmland prices.)
(c) Farmland price movement increases. For
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Panel  A. Farmland  Price  Movement  = -$300
Direct  Return  = $125
Decision
1000  1460  1900  2360  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  D. Farmland  Price  Movement  = +$150
Direct  Return  = $205
Decision
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  B, Farmland  Price  Movement  = -$150
Direct  Return  = $150
)ecision
1000  1460  1900  2350  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  C. Farmland  Price  Movement  = $0
Direct  Return  = $175
Decision
1000  1460  1900  2360  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  E. Farmland  Price  Movement  = $300
Direct  Return  = $245
Current  Price of  Land
Legend
Debt-to-Farm-






Figure  2.  Optimal  decisions  for  a  740-acre
farm having differing debt-to-farm-asset  ratios
example, at a $175 direct return and a $1,900
current farmland price,  optimal decisions are
a  240-acre  sale  for a  -$300  farmland  price
movement  (panel  A), a zero-acre  purchase  at
a $0 farmland price movement (panel C), and
a 720-acre purchase at a $300 price movement
(panel  E).  Higher farmland  price  movements
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creasing  expected  farmland  prices  in  future
years.
Optimal  decisions  also vary  with  differing
debt-to-farm-asset  ratios as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2's axes are similar to those in figure  1.
However,  here  each  panel represents  a fixed
farmland  price  movement  and  a fixed direct
return.  The panels  contain  lines representing
optimal  decisions  for  differing  debt-to-farm-
asset ratios. Optimal decisions for lower debt-
to-farm-asset  ratios are greater than those for
higher debt-to-farm-asset ratios. For example,
optimal farmland investment decisions for $0
farmland price movement, $175  direct return,
and $1,900  farmland price range from a 320-
acre  purchase  for  a  -. 50  debt-to-farm-asset
ratio to a liquidation decision  for a  .75  debt-
to-farm-asset ratio.
Higher beginning  debt-to-farm-asset  ratios
and larger farmland  investment decisions  re-
sult in higher debt-to-farm-asset  ratios. Three
features within the model reduce incentives for
maintaining  high  debt-to-farm-asset  ratios.
First, the increasing interest  rate structure  on
higher  positive  debt-to-farm-asset  ratios  in-
creases interest  costs relative  to farmland re-
turns (see equation (18)).  Second,  the progres-
sive income  tax  structure  leads to  a concave
recursive  objective  function.  This  concavity
resembles a cardinal utility function in a model
containing risk aversion,  thus reducing incen-
tives  for maintaining  high debt-to-farm-asset
ratios.
A third feature deals with the 5% transaction
cost  on  farmland  sales.  When  returns  and
farmland prices  are  rising, expected  terminal
wealth  is  increased by  holding  high  debt-to-
farm-asset  ratios.  However,  if  returns  and
farmland  prices  fall-which  can  occur  with
fairly high probability-high  debt-to-farm-as-
set  ratios  decrease  expected  wealth  levels.
Farmland is sold when returns and prices are
falling  to  avoid  large  decreases  in  terminal
wealth. Larger sales occur for farms with higher
debt-to-farm-asset  ratios, increasing the farm-
land sales transaction costs for higher debt-to-
farm-asset  ratios.  Thus,  these  costs  decrease
expected terminal wealth for high debt-to-farm-
asset ratios.
Farm Sizes, Debt-to-Farm-Asset
Ratios, and the Optimal Decision Rule
It is important to note that the optimal  deci-
sions presented above are for a point in time.
Applying the optimal decision rule yearly will
result in distributions of farm  sizes and debt-
to-farm-asset  ratios.  The  conditional  proba-
bility  methods  developed  for DP models  by
Bellman  and  Howard  were  used  to  analyze
these distributions. These methods require se-
lecting a beginning state in an initial year. The
optimal  decision  rule  and  state  transition
equations  are  then  used  to  develop  ex  ante
forecasts  of distributions  in future years.
Conditional  probabilities  were  calculated
using  beginning  direct  return  and  farmland
price rates resembling  1985 conditions: a $150
direct return, a $2,200 current farmland price,
and a  $2,500  lagged farmland  price. The  be-
ginning  farm  size was  740 acres  and five  dif-
fering beginning debt-to-farm-asset ratios were
used:  .50,  .25,  .00,  -. 25,  -. 50.  As reported
on the first line of table  1, optimal decisions
in the first year are to liquidate the farm when
the  debt-to-farm-asset  ratio  equals  .5,  sell
farmland  when the  debt-to-asset  ratio equals
.25 or  -. 25,  and purchase  farmland when the
debt-to-farm-asset  ratio equals  -. 50.
The next eight lines of table  1 show  condi-
tional probabilities  for farm  size and debt-to-
farm-asset ratio categories after five sequential
applications of the optimal  decision rule and
the  state  transition  equations  (i.e.,  in  1990).
Given a  .25  beginning  debt-to-farm-asset  ra-
tio, the probability of  being out of  farm is .0000,
of having a 500- to 740-acre farm  is .6346,  of
having  an  820-  to  1,140-acre  farm  is  .2198,
and of having a  1,200-  to  1,460-acre  farm  is
.1456.  Debt-to-farm-asset  ratio  probabilities
for no debt, .00 to .25,  .25  to .50,  and greater
than  .50  categories  are  .5518,  .1044,  .2983,
and .0440, respectively. The last two lines show
the mean values for farm size and the debt-to-
farm-asset ratio means. The .25 beginning debt-
to-farm-asset ratio has a mean farm size of 760
acres  and  a mean  debt-to-farm-asset  ratio of
.0185.
In  1990, farms with lower beginning  debt-
to-farm-asset  ratios tend to have larger farms.
This is illustrated by means of the conditional
farm  sizes (see table 2). The conditional mean
for the  .25  beginning debt-to-farm-asset  ratio
is  756  acres,  approximately  the same  size as
in  1985.  The  remaining  lower  debt-to-farm-
asset  ratios  grow  over  the  five-year  period.
However,  farmland  purchases  generally  re-
quire little debt financing. The majority of the
probability in1990  is in the no-debt category
for all beginning debt-to-farm-asset  ratios.
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Table  1.  Conditional  Probabilities in  1990  (after Five  Years)  for  a 740-Acre  Farm Having
Differing  Debt-to-Farm-Asset  Ratios in  1985
Debt-to-Farm-Asset-Ratio  in  1985
.50  .25  .00  -. 25  -. 50
Optimal Decision in  1985  -740  -240  -160  -80  +80
Farm Size Probabilities
Out of farminga  1.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
500 to 740  acres  .0000  .6346  .4641  .0865  .0000
820 to  1,140  acres  .0000  .2198  .1834  .4888  .4305
1,200 to  1,460  acres  .0000  .1456  .3524  .4247  .5695
Debt-to-Farm-Asset  Ratio  Probabilities
no debtb  1.0000  .5518  .5615  .5641  .6368
.00 to .25  .0000  .1044  .0858  .3124  .3632
.25 to .50  .0000  .2983  .3527  .1235  .0000
>.50  .0000  .0440  .0000  .0000  .0000
Meansc
Farm Size (Acres)  NAd  760  969  1,108  1,236
Debt-to-Farm-Asset  Ratio  NAd  .0185  -. 0276  -. 0775  -. 1436
aThe farm was either liquidated  or became bankrupt over the five-year  period.
b A debt-to-farm-asset  ratio less than  .00.
c  Means  were computed over positive farm  sizes.
d Not applicable.
Comparisons of the DP and  not considered  future purchase  and sell  deci-
Capital Budgeting  Model  sions.  Not  considering  future  decisions  may
lead to nonoptimal decisions if  the current de-
In essence, the DP model is a capital budgeting  cision affects the cash flows of future decisions.
model that considers all possible combinations  A current  purchase  or sale impacts  on future
of purchasing  and selling farmland in current  decisions' cash flow by changing debt financing
and  future  periods.  As traditionally  applied,  requirements for future purchases.  Moreover,
however, static capital budgeting models have  most traditional capital budgeting models rep-
Table  2.  Conditional  Probabilities in  1995  (after  Ten Years)  for  a  740-Acre  Farm Having
Differing Debt-to-Farm-Asset  Ratios in 1985
Debt-to-Farm-Asset-Ratio  in 1985
.50  .25  .00  -. 25  -. 50
Farm Size Probabilities
Out of Farminga  1.0000  .0474  .0539  .0626  .0701
500 to 740 acres  .0000  .1562  .0712  .0020  .0000
820 to  1,140 acres  .0000  .1336  .1176  .1258  .0688
1,200  to 1,460  acres  .0000  .6628  .7573  .8096  .8612
Debt-to-Farm-Asset  Ratio Probabilities
No debtb  1.0000  .1718  .1811  .4193  .9624
.00  to .25  .0000  .1577  .5881  .5770  .0376
.25  to .50  .0000  .6518  .2308  .0030  .0000
>.50  .0000  .0187  .0000  .0000  .0000
Meansc
Farm Size (Acres)  NAd  1,235  1,327  1,373  1,413
Debt-to-Farm-Asset  Ratio  NAd  .2541  .1348  -. 0155  -. 1200
a The farm was either  liquidated or became bankrupt over the ten-year period.
b A debt-to-farm-asset  ratio less  than .00.
c  Means  were computed over positive farm sizes.
d Not applicable.
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resent all random variables,  such as farmland
returns, with their expected values. This sub-
stitution results in nonoptimal decisions if cer-
tainty equivalence requirements (Simon; Theil)
are not met. These  requirements  are violated
because of progressive  income taxes (Taylor).
To account for these differences,  a static de-
terministic  capital budgeting (CB) model was
constructed that differs from the DP model in
only two  respects.  First,  the  CB model  only
considers investment decisions in the first year
of the planning horizon. This  differs from the
DP  model  which  considers  decisions  at  the
beginning of each year. Second, the CB model
only uses the expected values of the direct re-
turn distribution in determining expected ter-
minal wealth.  This differs from the DP model
which  considers  the entire  direct  return  dis-
tribution.
As with the  DP model,  decision rules gen-
erated by the CB  model converge after a suf-
ficiently long planning horizon is specified.  To
find the converged decision rule, the CB model
was  solved for  a one-year  planning  horizon,
then a  two-year planning  horizon,  and  so on
using  the  same  state  and  decision  variable
discretion as  used in the DP -model. Conver-
gence occurs by the tenth year. Converged de-
cisions  from the  CB model  are shown by the
dotted lines  in figure  3. In addition,  optimal
farmland  investment  decisions  from  the  DP
model are shown for comparison purposes. All
decisions are for a 740-acre  farm having a .25
debt-to-farm-asset  ratio.
The CB model's  decisions differ systemati-
cally from the DP model's optimal decisions.
The CB model indicates  larger farmland  pur-
chases than the DP model at low current farm-
land prices.  Then the lines for the CB model's
decisions  cross  the  DP  model  and  indicate
larger farmland  sales at  higher  current  farm-
land  prices.  This  phenomenon  is  illustrated
clearly in panels A, B, and C. In panels D and
E, the CB lines do not have an opportunity to
cross the DP model's decisions due to the up-
per constraint on farm  size.
The  systematic  differences  suggest that the
CB  model  generates  decisions  that are  over-
responsive relative to the DP model, resulting
in  a larger  range  of decisions.  For  example,
given the farmland price movement and direct
return  shown in panel  A, decisions  from  the
CB model  range from a 720-acre  purchase  to
liquidation  while  the  DP  model's  decisions
range  from  a  240-acre  sale  to  liquidation.
Overresponsiveness  occurs  for  two  reasons.
First, the  CB  model only considers decisions
at the current time; thus farm size changes are
presumed to  occur only at that time. Second,
the CB model treats a stochastic problem in a
deterministic  fashion.  Deterministic  treat-
ment does not consider the entire Markovian
direct return  distribution and the effects  that
alternative  direct return realizations  have  on
future farmland prices and debt-to-farm-asset
ratios. These factors can lead to overaggressive
purchasing  and selling strategies.
Following  the  overresponsive  CB  model's
decisions may lead to reductions in wealth. To
evaluate these reductions,  10-year conditional
probabilities  were  calculated  using  the  CB
model's  decisions.  These  probabilities  were
calculated using the same beginning state vari-
able  levels  as those  used  in calculating  con-
ditional probability  from  the DP model,  as-
suming  that  the  CB  model's  converged
decisions  were  successively  applied  in  each
year.  Once the 1995  (i.e., after  10 years)  con-
ditional probabilities were found, the expected
value  of after-tax wealth was calculated.  This
value is conceptually similar to a balance sheet
net worth figure.
Expected  after-tax wealths in 1995  that re-
sult from  following  the DP and  CB  models'
decision  rules  are  shown  respectively  in  the
first two  columns  of table  3. In  addition,  re-
ductions in after-tax wealth from following the
CB  model's  decisions  are  given  in the third
column.  The only debt-to-farm-asset  ratio  in
which a reduction does not occur is the .5 debt-
to-farm-asset  category.  In  this  case,  both
models  indicate  that the optimal  decision  in
the first years  is to liquidate the farming  op-
eration. Except for this debt-to-farm-asset  ra-
tio,  significant  reductions  in expected  wealth
are incurred by following the CB model's de-
cisions. These reductions can exceed $200,000.
Concluding  Comments
The DP model was solved for a fairly restricted
farm type and geographical area. However, this
model  represents  a general  methodology  for
analyzing factors inherent in most agricultural
and nonagricultural  land investment possibil-
ities,  namely,  land  returns  that  exhibit  sto-
chastic, dynamic structures and land prices that
are linked to realized returns. As illustrated by
the capital  budgeting  model,  not accounting
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Panel  A.  Farmland  Price  Movement  = -$300
Direct  Return = $125
Decision
1000
1000  1460 1900  2360  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  B. Farmland  Price Movement  =  -$150
Direct  Return = $150
)ecision
1000  1460  1900  2360  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price  of Land
Panel  C. Farmland  Price  Movement  = $0
Direct  Return  = $175
1000  1460  1900  2360  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price of Land
for these factors  may lead to nonoptimal  de-
cisions.
The comparison  of the DP and CB models
also suggests features desirable in an analytical
and  numerical  optimization  framework  for
Panel  D. Farmland  Price  Movement  = +$150
Direct  Return  = $205
Decision
1000  1460  1900  2350  2800  3260  3700
Current  Price of  Land
Panel  E. Farmland  Price  Movement  = +$300
Direct  Return = $245
Current  Price  of  Land
Legend
Model Line  Type
DP-PS
B-PS..............
Figure  3.  Optimal decisions  for  the  DP-PS
and CB-PS  models  given a 740-acre farm hav-
ing a .25  debt-to-farm-asset  ratio
analyzing land investments: the ability to con-
sider future investment decisions and the abil-
ity to incorporate distribution of random vari-
ables.  The former  feature  can be handled  by
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Table  3.  Expected  Wealths  after Ten Years
from the DP and CB Models  (in 1984 Dollars)
Initial
Debt-to-Farm-  DP  CB  Wealth
Asset Ratio  Model  Model  Reductiona
.-----------------------------------  (dollars) -----------------------------------.
.50  1,940,080  1,940,080  0
.25  1,752,716  1,568,668  184,048
.00  2,323,062  2,107,458  215,604
-. 25  2,828,857  2,642,310  186,547
-. 50  3,383,204  3,264,556  118,648
aThe DP model's wealth  minus the CB  model's wealth.
ear  programming  models,  multiperiod  qua-
dratic programming  models, stochastic linear
programming  models,  and  multiperiod  min-
imization of total absolute deviations models.
However,  these frameworks either do not con-
sider uncertainty  or rely  on certainty equiva-
lence  properties  to  incorporate  uncertainty.
This reliance may cause nonoptimal decisions.
Another  possibility  is  simulation models;
however, finding optimal decisions with a sim-
ulation  model  requires  an  exhaustive  search
which is not efficient (Bellman). Optimal con-
trol theory is another possibility;  however,  at
its  current  style  of development,  finding  op-
timal solutions  is difficult (Whittle).
This  discussion  does  not  suggest  that  dy-
namic  programming  is  the  only  alternative.
Rather, the point is that if the emphasis of the
research  is on dynamic  factors,  dynamic pro-
gramming can incorporate these factors with-
out  relying  on  certainty  equivalence  require-
ments or any assumption concerning functional
forms and types of distributions. A price may
have  to be  paid  for this  flexibility.  Dynamic
programming  models  tend  to  require  large
amounts of time and  may not be  able to in-
corporate  as much "detail"  as other alterna-
tives.
[Received July 1988; final revision
received January  1989.]
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